The High Court Rules No Redress in Nevada Courts for Wrong-Doing in Georgia That "Affects" Persons in Nevada

Today the United States Supreme Court reversed a ruling of the Ninth Circuit.  In Walden v. Fiore, the Court held that “a court in Nevada may [not] exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis that he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Georgia would delay the return of funds to plaintiffs with
connections in Nevada.”  The Court reasoned that “a plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”  The Ninth Circuit held that personal jurisdiction in Nevada was proper because the defendant's allegedly tortious actions in Atlanta, Georgia affected persons with a “significant connection” to Nevada.
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Ninth Circuit Takes Up Unique Nevada Voting Law

Today, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal heard oral argument regarding the constitutionality of a voting law unique to Nevada.  Nevada voters may choose to cast their ballot for "none of these candidates" in elections, though the choice cannot "win" the election.

The law has been on the books since the 1970's and was challenged last year by the Republican party as being unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit blocked a ruling by United States District Court judge Hon. Robert Jones siding with the Republican party, allowing the ballot choice to go forward for the 2012 national election. Oral agrument took place this morning before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit.

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Arizona's Immigration Law Is Mostly Unconstitutional, Says US Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court handed down its long anticiated ruling in Arizona v. Untied States, putting at issue Arizona's controversial immigration law, SB 1070, passed in 2010.  The Ninth Circuit struck down the law in its entirety, and Arizona appealed to the US Supreme Court. Today, the US Supreme Court struck down three of four provisions as violating the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution.
The Arizona law sought to criminalize the failure to comply with federal registration requirements for illegal alieans, and seeking employment or engaging in work in Arizona while being an illegal alien. SB 1070 also gave authority to Arizona law enforcement to arrest without a warrant anyone who the officer had probable cause to believe is an illegal alien, and to stop, detain or arrest to determine a person's immigration status.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to provide that in areas where the federal government intends that its laws occupy the entire subject matter of that law, no state can enact laws that attempt to address that subject matter.  It has long been held that the federal government occupies the entire subject matter of immigration and that states cannot regulate this subject matter.  In striking down the criminal elements and the authority to arrest without a warrant granted by SB 1070, the US Supreme Court pointed out that the federal government has established that illegal alien status is a civil, not criminal matter, and that the federal government has the sole discretion to make such policy decisions regarding immigration and its enforcement.  The Court stated, "Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime."  The Court went on to state that the federal government has the power to consider equities in forming policies regarding enforcement of the federal immigration laws.
This particular point gets to the heart of the matter.  Arixona's SB 1070 sought to make criminals of immigrants, who may be hard working, otherwise law abiding residents.  This is not Arizona's call. This is the federal government's call.  The scare tactics employed by Arizona law makers that illegal aliens are all rampant, violent criminals, casts a net that ensnares workers trying to make a living and who make a positiove contribution to society.  Enacting laws based on fear and ignorance harken back to some of the darker moments in human history, and should have no part in this country's democratic society.  Additionally, the Supremacy Clause prevents the 50 states from enacting 50 different sets of immigration laws, as the federal government already has a body of law in place. 
The Court upheld the provision of SB 1070 that authorizes Arizona law enforcement to "make a 'reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status' of any person they stop, detain, or arrest . . ."  The Court emphasized that SB 1070 provided that the "stop and check" provision could not be the result of racial profiling and that communication between federal and state authorities was inherent and imperative. 
Despite holding the challenge to the stop and check provision of SB 1070 as being premature because Arizona courts did not have an opportunity to interpret how it will be enforced, the Court specifically left open future challenges to the stop and check provision based on Arizona's enforcement and interpretation of its law.



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Ninth Circuit Rules Lower Court Appropriately Considered Award of Attorney's Fees Under ERISA To Plaintiff After Grant of Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff's Claims

On June 24, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court decided an ERISA case entitled
Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infinity.  Where a plaintiff's claim under ERISA 
has achieved "some degree of success on the merits," the plaintiff may seek
attoreny's fees under section 1132(g) under ERISA.

In this case, Plaintiff's claim for continuing disability benefits was dismissed on
summary judgment, and Plaintiff's "degree of success" amounted to Defendant
Hartford agreeing to dismiss its counterclaim for overpayment of benefits due
to retroactive SSDI payments received by Plaintiff, after Plaintiff informed
Hartford that the Social Security Administration subsequently retroactively
reduced his SSDI award.

The Ninth Circuit, relying on the recent Supreme Court case Hardt v.
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 560 U.S. ___ (2010), concluded 
that in exercising its discretion to award attorney's fees, a trial court must apply
the factors enumerated in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446
(9th Cir. 1980), to guide the trial court's decision as to whether to award
attorney's fees a determination that the plaintiff has acheived "some degree of
success" under ERISA..
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Federal Court, Rather Than Arbitrator, Had Authority to Rule on Enforceability of Arbitration Clause In Employment Agreement

Last week the United States Supreme Court decided a case originating out of Nevada,

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___ (2010).  An employee of Rent-A-

Center filed an employment discrimination suit in federal court, and the employer filed a

motion to compel arbitration.  On Certiorari from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled

that under the Federal Arbitration Act, codified in Title 9 of the United States Code (FAA),

the courts could decide the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an employment agreement 

that stated the arbitrator must decide the enforceability of the agreement as a whole,  

whereas only the arbitrator could decide whether the employment agreement as a whole

was enforceable.

In opposing the motion to compel arbitration, Jackson argued the arbitration clause was unconscionable under Nevada law.  The federal trial court dismissed, stating the arbtration clause prevented it from deciding Jackson's unconscionable argument. Jackson appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed, stating the courts decide the threshold question of whether the agreement was enforceable, affirmed the trial court's finding against Jackson on part of his unconscionable argument, and remanding for the trail court to decide the remainder of Jackson's unconscionable argument.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion, and pointed out that Jackson's challenge was not to the validity of the agreement but to his manifestation of intent to the arbitration clause based on his unconscionability agrument.  Additionally, Jackson's briefs argued the entire agreement was invalid.  Based on those observations, Scalia concluded that Jackson's challenge was to the validity of the agreement as a whole versus the validity of the arbitration clause, and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.

Relying on First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), Justice Stevens dissented, reasoning that the arbitration clause at issue did not "clearly and unmistakeably" evince Jackson's assent to arbitration because of his unconscionability argument.  Stevens characterized Scalia's opinion as a "'fantastic' and likely erroneous decision" because it went beyond what the parties asked the Court to decide.  Stevens also asserted that the majority opinion expanded the holding in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), where the challenge was to the validity of the agreement due to fraud in the inducement, and not to the embedded arbitration clause.  Thus, Stevens would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision.

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Ninth Circuit Finds NY Attorney Entitled to Additional Fees for Value of Referring Case to Nevada Law Firm

The Ninth Circuit has remanded a fee dispute case between attorneys to the trial court for a recalculation of the fees the referring New York attorney is entitled to for the referral to the Nevada law firm that successfully settled the case.

New York attorney Brian Fitzgerald referred a medical malpractice case to the Nevada law firm and alleged that there was an oral agreement to share the fees 50/50. The trial court rejected this argument, instead awarding Fitzgerald fees based on quantum meruit in an amount totaling one third of the added value to the client for Fitzgerald convincing the Nevada law firm to lower its contingency fee arrangement with the client. Fitzgerald appealed both the rejection of the oral agreement and the award under the theory of quantum meruit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's rejection of the oral agreement, but remanded the case for the trial court to recalculate the quantum meruit award. The Court concluded that the trial court did not properly consider the value to the Nevada law firm of Fitzgerald's referral of the case to the firm.

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Ninth Circuit Reverses Las Vegas Judge's Grant of Rule 50(b) Motion

On March 3, 2009, the Ninth Circuit published the opinion, Tortu v. LVMPD, reversing a decision of the U.S. District Court District of Nevada, Hon. Robert C. Jones presiding. The plaintiff sued the Las Vegas Metro Police Dept. and several Metro Police officers for unreasonable force when plaintiff was arrested at McCarren International Airport. The jury found in favor of two of the officers and found a third officer, Engle, liable to the plaintiff. Engle filed a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The court granted both motions.

The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that Engle was not entitled to file a Rule 50(b) motion without first having filed a Rule 50(a) motion prior to submission of the case to the jury. The Court cited the plain language of the Rule and the 1991 advisory committee notes stating, "This provision retains the concept of the former rule that the post-verdict motion is a renewal of an earlier motion made at the close of evidence."

The Court also reversed the district court's grant of Engle's Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion because the weight of evidence was not against the jury's verdict. Contrary to the district court's reasoning that finding for the other two officers conflicted with the jury's finding for plaintiff against Engle, the Ninth Circuit conluded only that plaintiff had not met his burden of showing excessive force by the other two officers, particularly where separate evidence as to Officer Engle was given. Moreover, the district court was not entitled to substitute its evaluation of the evidence for the jury's, simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict. Thus, the jury's verdict was not irreconcilable, and Engle could have been found liable while the other two officers were not found liable.
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