The High Court Rules No Redress in Nevada Courts for Wrong-Doing in Georgia That "Affects" Persons in Nevada

Today the United States Supreme Court reversed a ruling of the Ninth Circuit.  In Walden v. Fiore, the Court held that “a court in Nevada may [not] exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis that he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Georgia would delay the return of funds to plaintiffs with
connections in Nevada.”  The Court reasoned that “a plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”  The Ninth Circuit held that personal jurisdiction in Nevada was proper because the defendant's allegedly tortious actions in Atlanta, Georgia affected persons with a “significant connection” to Nevada.
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OJ Simpson's Chances For A New Trial

OJ Simpson's bid to get a new trial in his Nevada convictions for 19 various felony counts ranging from kidnapping, assault, robbery and the use of a deadly weapon, resulted in a five-day evidentiary hearing from May 13 to May 17, 2013, last week.  Simpson's Petition was filed with the Clark County District Court over a year ago on May 12, 2012.  Various witnesses testified, including Simpson himself, a first in any of his criminal prosecutions, and Simpson's trial attorney, Yale Galanter, whom Simpson claims was ineffective at trial, entitling Simpson to a new trial.  At the evidentiary hearing, Galanter passionately denied any error or omission on his part during Simpson's trial.

Simpson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not uncommon when convicted criminal defendants have exhausted all their appeals as of right.  The claim is filed in the form of a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and is based on an allegation that the petitioner's Sixth Amendement Constitutional right to assistance of counsel was violated and thus unvalidates the petitioner's conviction.  The petition must first be filed in the trial court.  The standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel rising to a level that violates a defendant's constitutional rights to such a degree that would require a defendant to obtain a new trial is set forth in the 1984 United States Supreme Court decision of Strickland v. Washington, as adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court.in the case entitled Warden v. Lyons.

Under the Strickland standard, in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel sufficient  to invalidate a judgement of conviciton, Simpson is required to denonstrate (1) that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that his counsel's errors were so severe that they rendered the jury's verdict unreliable.  The Nevada Supreme Court has held that the severity of the errors must have prejudiced the defendant to such a degree that but for the errors, the verdict would probably have been differenct.  According to Nevada case law, in deciding the petition the trial court need not address both components of the inquiry if Simpson makes an insufficient showing on either one.

The Strickland test is a high bar for a convicted defendant to overcome, and in Nevada, defendants' petitions have been denied even in cases where trial counsel admitted to embezzling large amounts of their clients' money, and in cases where a juror subsequently provided an affidavit indicating he witnessed the defendant's trial counsel sleeping during the trial.  Statistically speaking, it is not likely that Simpson's petition will be granted, so we may see an appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court in the future.

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Ninth Circuit Takes Up Unique Nevada Voting Law

Today, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal heard oral argument regarding the constitutionality of a voting law unique to Nevada.  Nevada voters may choose to cast their ballot for "none of these candidates" in elections, though the choice cannot "win" the election.

The law has been on the books since the 1970's and was challenged last year by the Republican party as being unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit blocked a ruling by United States District Court judge Hon. Robert Jones siding with the Republican party, allowing the ballot choice to go forward for the 2012 national election. Oral agrument took place this morning before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit.

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The Oklahoma Supreme Court Should Have Read This Blog

Apparently irritated at the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court today summarily reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision incorrectly ruling that an arbitrator, rather than the court, must decide whether an arbitration clause in an employment contract was valid.  See this blog's report of the United States Supreme Court's prior decision on this issue here. 

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Arizona's Immigration Law Is Mostly Unconstitutional, Says US Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court handed down its long anticiated ruling in Arizona v. Untied States, putting at issue Arizona's controversial immigration law, SB 1070, passed in 2010.  The Ninth Circuit struck down the law in its entirety, and Arizona appealed to the US Supreme Court. Today, the US Supreme Court struck down three of four provisions as violating the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution.
The Arizona law sought to criminalize the failure to comply with federal registration requirements for illegal alieans, and seeking employment or engaging in work in Arizona while being an illegal alien. SB 1070 also gave authority to Arizona law enforcement to arrest without a warrant anyone who the officer had probable cause to believe is an illegal alien, and to stop, detain or arrest to determine a person's immigration status.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to provide that in areas where the federal government intends that its laws occupy the entire subject matter of that law, no state can enact laws that attempt to address that subject matter.  It has long been held that the federal government occupies the entire subject matter of immigration and that states cannot regulate this subject matter.  In striking down the criminal elements and the authority to arrest without a warrant granted by SB 1070, the US Supreme Court pointed out that the federal government has established that illegal alien status is a civil, not criminal matter, and that the federal government has the sole discretion to make such policy decisions regarding immigration and its enforcement.  The Court stated, "Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime."  The Court went on to state that the federal government has the power to consider equities in forming policies regarding enforcement of the federal immigration laws.
This particular point gets to the heart of the matter.  Arixona's SB 1070 sought to make criminals of immigrants, who may be hard working, otherwise law abiding residents.  This is not Arizona's call. This is the federal government's call.  The scare tactics employed by Arizona law makers that illegal aliens are all rampant, violent criminals, casts a net that ensnares workers trying to make a living and who make a positiove contribution to society.  Enacting laws based on fear and ignorance harken back to some of the darker moments in human history, and should have no part in this country's democratic society.  Additionally, the Supremacy Clause prevents the 50 states from enacting 50 different sets of immigration laws, as the federal government already has a body of law in place. 
The Court upheld the provision of SB 1070 that authorizes Arizona law enforcement to "make a 'reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status' of any person they stop, detain, or arrest . . ."  The Court emphasized that SB 1070 provided that the "stop and check" provision could not be the result of racial profiling and that communication between federal and state authorities was inherent and imperative. 
Despite holding the challenge to the stop and check provision of SB 1070 as being premature because Arizona courts did not have an opportunity to interpret how it will be enforced, the Court specifically left open future challenges to the stop and check provision based on Arizona's enforcement and interpretation of its law.



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Would You Like Broccoli With That Health Insurance Plan? The Supremes Discuss The Slippery Slope Of ObamaCare

Broccoli, cell phones and burial services, oh my! What will the government force us to buy next? The parade of horribles was the topic du jour at Tuesday's oral argument before the US Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the individual mandate contained in the Affordable Care Act. The Supremes expressed concern over the slippery slope potentially created by the ACA and where the line should be drawn. At issue is whether the individual mandate of the ACA is authorized by the United States Constitution art. 1 sec. 8 clause 3, the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has, over the past 190 years, interpreted the Commerce Clause to allow congress to regulate all sorts of industries, from ship navigation, to the Chicago meat industry, to wheat production for personal use.


Justice Scalia, notorious for his conservative legal opinions, asked the first question of Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, setting the tone for the day. Scalia queried, perhaps disingenuously, why couldn't the federal government just directly address the problems of individual access to health care rather than the individual mandate to purchase health insurance. The answer of course, is that the present Congress will not create a public health care option. Appropriately, Mr. Verrilli did not give this answer, but offered instead that the ACA is in fact addressing the problem directly.


The Justices' questions centered around the concern that if Congress can require individuals to purchase health care, why can't Congress require the purchase of a cell phone, of broccoli, of health club memberships or of funeral services? Verrilli;s answer to these questions pointed out the health care market is different because (a) it is the only market where you can show up without the means to pay and you will still be provided the service at the expense of those who do pay; (b) everyone will eventually need health care and thus everyone is a market participant; (c) the ACA seeks to regulate the health care industry, not the insurance industry, and requires the method of payment for health care be through health insurance; (d) the ACA uses the most efficient method that allows consumer choice among insurance policies; and (e) the ACA does not provide any enforcement powers--if insurance is not purchased, the penalty is not anymore than what one would have paid for the insurance.


The respondents arguing to strike the mandate did not have any easier a time with the Justices. Attorney Paul Clemente, arguing for the respondent 26 states, argued the ACA forces individuals to purchase a product. Clemente argued that defining the market as those who access health care was improper, and that the market being regulated was those that purchased insurance. Clemente suggested it would be constitutional for the ACA instead to only require that insurance be purchased at the point of sale; i.e. only when one gets sick and shows up to the Emergency Room. The Justices focused their questions to Clemente on issues regarding the definition of the market being regualted (insurance versus health care), the fact that uninsured patients already shift the cost of their health care to paying patients, and what difference does it make if the ACA requires the purchase of insurance prior to getting sick or at the time of receiving health care services.


Justice Breyer proposed a hypothetical situation several times to the respondent attorneys, asking, what if "a disease is sweeping the United States, and 40 million people are susceptible, of whom 10 million will die; can't the federal Government say all 40 million get inoculated?" Mr. Clemente avoided answering, which perhaps accounts for Justice Breyer's attempt three more times to get an answer. Justice Breyer then changed the hypothetical to whether the EPA could require all automobiles have anti pollution equipment if it turned out 60% of them caused pollution. Attorney Carvin conceded the commerce clause authorized Congress to enact such a law but pointed out only those who bought automobiles would be required to do so.


The problem with the respondents' argument is they attempt to limit the individuals affected in the market being regulated by the ACA to those purchasing insurance, leading to their protest that Congress is requiring an affirmative purchase of a product that would not otherwise be purchased. To hear the respondents say it, the 40 million uninsured are uninsured by choice, rather than because they cannot afford the premiums, and thus should not be forced to purchase an unwanted product. Justice Ginsberg's comparison of the ACA to the social security system is well taken, albiet, social security is funded by a tax, making it a different animal. The truth is, as many of the Justices pointed out, every person from the time they are born will at some point need to use health care. That is the industry that the ACA targets. The ACA mandates that health care is paid for by insurance, which the respondents concede is a proper Congressional power under the commerce clause. As Justice Kennedy pointed out, "the young [healthy] person is uniquely proximately very close to affecting the rates of insurance and the costs of providing medical care in a way that s not true in other industries." Thus their participation directly affects the price others will pay not just for insurance, but for health care. Health care costs go up because hospitals are required by federal law to treat those who cannot pay for their services, thus shifting the costs to everyone else. The respondents' solution that those who "choose" not to purchase insurance can be required to purchase it at the time they do need health cares serices, is not only unreasonable and naive, but implausible.

As Mr. Vermilli pointed out, 40 million Americans can not obtain health care insurance because of the cost of the premiums. If a point of sale requirement were placed on these individuals as argued by the respondents, the cost of insurance would essentially be the cost of the health service. Actuarially, the premium you pay is based on some calculus of the chance you will get sick and how much the health care you might need could cost. If someone shows up at the Emergency Room and endeavors to purchase insurance then and there, the chance that you will get sick is 100% because you are currently sick, and the cost is more or less calculable. So, the premium, from an actuarial point of view and the point of view of the insurance company should be the cost of the treatment you are seeking. Which brings us back to the uninsured showing up to the Emergency Room with no means of paying The cost would still be shifted to others with insurance.

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Noteworthy U.S. Supreme Court Decisions of 2010

Once again, this year, I was mesmerized by the melodic cadence of renowned Professor Erwin Chemerinsky’s lecture discussing the significant U.S. Supreme Court opinions of 2010.  Here is a tongue in cheek recap of some of the more interesting decisions Professor Chemerinsky highlighted.

• Don’t expect a Fourth Amendment right to privacy when sending text messages with employer-owned equipment to your mistress while on the job.

City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. ___ (2010).

• If you want to invoke your right to remain silent, break your silence and say so.

Berguis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. ___ (2010).

• Justice Scalia has decided the invocation of the right to counsel while being questioned automatically expires after 14 days.  Thus, the new police interrogation  techniques will be to arrest and Mirandize  a suspect, and if he invokes his right to counsel during questioning, simply wait 14 day periods before interrogating again.

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___ (2010).

• Locking up your teenager and throwing away the key for anything less than murder is cruel and unusual punishment.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___ (2010).

• Criminal lawyers who want to get their resident alien clients off, advise them to plead guilty and then misadvise them a guilty plea will not result in automatic deportation.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___ (2010).

• Corporations are people too; at least when it comes to the First Amendment and spending money in election campaigns.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. ___ (2010).

Professor Chemerinsky has a unique ability to keep participants attentive with not only his distinctive style of speech, but with his humorous side notes and commentary.  This year I noticed that not only do more questions get asked in Professor Chemerinsky's CLE lectures, but the questions are generally the sort one would have asked in one's Constitutional Law class in law school to impress the professor, i.e., statements of opinion or analysis disguised as questions:  "Well, is it your opinion professor that this case modifies the (insert obscure reference to case law not being discussed) case?"

But, I have to admit, listening to my fellow attendees attempt to impress Professor Chemerinsky is almost as much fun as listening to his lecture.

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My Afternoon With Erwin....Chemerinsky, That Is.

During my last minute marathon in December to get all my Continuing Legal Education credits before the year's end, I had the pleasure of landing in a CLE lecture given by Erwin Chemerinsky at the Boyd School of Law. Chemerinsky, is of course a reknowned law school Professor of constitutional law, and is the founding Dean of the University of California at Irvin School of Law. Chemerinsky's unique vocal cadence and his particular brand of humor always makes dry legal subjects sound more interesting. Of course, Chemerinsky's area of law is far from dry; who isn't interested in the nuances of the sexy parts of constitutional law? The CLE did not disappoint as Chemerinsky recapped the most interesting and significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions for 2009. Here are summaries of three of the Supreme Court decisions he discussed that have particular relevance to Nevada.

A Complaint Can No Longer Rely on the Notice Pleading Standard to Avoid Dismissal.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Despite being less than one year old, Ashcroft is on the verge of being the most cited case in history, according to Chemerinsky. The reason it is so important is that the circuit courts are treating Ashcroft as a new standard in pleading requirements. Notice pleading is no longer sufficient to avoid dismissal. The plaintiff must allege facts that make his claim "plausible," not just a recital of the elements, and the reviewing court may draw on common sense and its experience within the context of the allegations to determining plausibility.

Litigants May Not Contribute to the Presiding Judge's Election Campaign.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). Where a judge receives substantial campaign contributions from a litigant, and does not recuse herself, due process is violated. Being that Nevada elects its judges, this ruling has the potential to put a monkey wrench in the Nevada Judiciary. As was reported in depth by the Los Angeles Times back in 2005, Nevada is still a relatively small business and legal community, and it is not unheard of for litigants to contribute to a judge's campaign, even to the judge before which they are appearing. Caperton may change that practice. Even better, Nevada may finally adopt another system for choosing judges.

Certiorari Granted To Decide If Second Amendment Applies to State Governments.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 129 S. Ct. ___ (2009). According to Chemerinsky, between the years 1791 - 2008, not one law was ever invalidated as violating the Second Amendment. Last year the Supreme Court invalidated a gun control law in Washington DC as barred by the Second Amendment. Now the Court will decide if the Second Amendment applies to state and local government.

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Ninth Circuit Finds NY Attorney Entitled to Additional Fees for Value of Referring Case to Nevada Law Firm

The Ninth Circuit has remanded a fee dispute case between attorneys to the trial court for a recalculation of the fees the referring New York attorney is entitled to for the referral to the Nevada law firm that successfully settled the case.

New York attorney Brian Fitzgerald referred a medical malpractice case to the Nevada law firm and alleged that there was an oral agreement to share the fees 50/50. The trial court rejected this argument, instead awarding Fitzgerald fees based on quantum meruit in an amount totaling one third of the added value to the client for Fitzgerald convincing the Nevada law firm to lower its contingency fee arrangement with the client. Fitzgerald appealed both the rejection of the oral agreement and the award under the theory of quantum meruit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's rejection of the oral agreement, but remanded the case for the trial court to recalculate the quantum meruit award. The Court concluded that the trial court did not properly consider the value to the Nevada law firm of Fitzgerald's referral of the case to the firm.

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US Supreme Court Vacates Seventh Circuit's Opinion for Failure to Consider All of Death Row Inmate's Arguments

 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Corcoran v. Indiana, 558 U.S. __ (2009), to death row 
inmate Joseph Corcoran in his appeal from the Seventh Circuit's reinstatement of his death sentence. 
Corcoran's habeas corpus Sixth Amendment challenge to his death sentence was granted by the 
district court but overturned by the Seventh Circuit.

In granting Corcoran's Habeas Corpus Petition, the district court stated Corcoran's other arguments 
against his death sentence were rendered moot. On appeal by Indiana, the Seventh Circuit failed to 
provide any explanation for disposing of Corcoran's other arguments, which included claims that the 
trial court committed various errors at sentencing, Indiana's capital sentence statute is unconsti-
tutional, prosecutorial misconduct at sentencing, and that Corcoran should not be put to death 
because he is mentally ill. The Supreme Court concluded the Seventh Circuit erred by not considering 
or explaining its disposal of Corcoran's other arguments, and remanded the case for resentencing.
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US Supreme Court Chief Justice Dissents from Court's Refusal to Hear DWI Case

AOL News reports that Chief Justice John Roberts has expressed his disagreement with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Joseph A. Moses Harris, Jr., 558 U.S, __ (2009), to deny certiorari in a DWI guilty verdict overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court. The Virginia Court overturned the conviction because the police were alerted to the defendant's drunk driving by an anonymous tipster without personally observing the defendant breaking any traffic laws prior to stopping the defendant.  
The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, pointed out that state and federal courts are divided as to whether a traffic stop based on an anonymous tip to police that the driver is drunk when the investigating officer did not personally observe any traffic violations prior to the traffic stop actually violates the Fourth Amendment. Justice Roberts expressed doubt that a DWI case would fall under the general rule expressed by Florida v. J.L., 520 U.S. 266, 270 (2000), because "[t]he imminence of the danger posed by drunk drivers exceeds that at issue in other types of cases."
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